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A B S T R A C T   
Industrial policy has re-emerged as an area of policy discussion in recent years, but the characteristics and role of 
industrial policy vary across national contexts. Particularly, the role of industrial policy in the ongoing energy 
transitions of different countries has received little attention. We introduce an analytical framework to explore 
the relationship between industrial policy and different energy policy trajectories and apply this framework in an 
empirical analysis of the perceptions of key stakeholders in the energy sector in Germany, the United Kingdom 
and Denmark. We identify four key elements of industrial policy – industrial visions, industrial policy in-
struments, industrial policy governance, and employment concerns – and based on these analyse perceptions of 
how industrial policy has facilitated changes in the energy system of the three countries. We find significant 
differences in industrial policy styles for low-carbon transitions, reflecting broader differences in political in-
stitutions and cultures. Our analysis shows how sustainability transitions relate to industrial policy, and which 
elements can act as enablers and barriers to low-carbon transitions.   
1. Introduction 
Industrial policy has been defined as “structural policies designed to 
strengthen the efficiency, scale and international competitiveness of 
domestic industrial sectors, typically containing an element of national 
champions, of self-reliance in bringing about growth and development” 
([1]: 273). After some absence, industrial policy has re-emerged in 
policy analyses and debates during the past decade [2,3]. The re- 
emergence has been labelled variously as a ‘return’ [4], ‘renaissance’ 
[5], ‘rejuvenation’ [6], ‘reinvention’[7], ‘resurrection’ [8], and ‘resur-
gence’ [9]. 
While industrial policy has had some overlap with innovation policy 
through the search for the sources of domestic competitiveness, much 
attention has in the past focused on supporting existing industrial pro-
cesses. The re-emerging industrial policy differs from the past in perhaps 
two respects. One, new industrial policy is more closely connected to 
innovation policy, emphasising regional economies and place-based 
characteristics, diversification of industrial structure, and entrepre-
neurial discovery – argued to lack a normative stance [2]. Two (partly 
contrary to one), green industrial policy has emerged as a notion making 
an explicit connection to environmental objectives [10,11]. Green in-
dustrial policy, broadly defined as “government intervention to hasten 
the restructuring of the economy towards environmental sustainability” 
([12]: 522), has limited grounding in the traditional industrial policy 
literature [13]. A key aspect of green industrial policy is shifting eco-
nomic trajectories away from traditional industries towards new, 
‘greener’ technological industrial futures, for example, by expanding 
industrial capacities around renewable energy manufacture [10,14]. 
This paper connects the notions of industrial policy and green in-
dustrial policy to the literature on low-carbon energy transitions, 
drawing from the field of sustainability transitions. Sustainability tran-
sitions address large-scale transformations in socio-technical systems, 
such as energy, mobility, water or food, reducing their negative envi-
ronmental impacts. Transition studies focus on socio-technical change, 
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having an interest in changes in practices, routines, culture, policy and 
institutions alongside and intertwined with technological change 
[15,16]. Much empirical attention has been paid to energy transitions, 
grounding the conceptual development of this literature [17]. Industrial 
policy is a relatively recent consideration in this literature [18] and 
mostly addressed in passing [19]. This can be regarded as somewhat 
surprising given that attention to public policy in transitions has 
received increasing interest [20] and industrial dynamics are a part of 
transforming socio-technical systems [21]. 
In sustainability transition studies, a key focus has been placed on 
how the nurturing and empowerment of new niche technologies lead to 
the destabilisation of unsustainable socio-technical regimes, typically 
for a particular focal sector such as energy [22–24]. In such accounts, 
the focal system in question is guided by the aims of achieving envi-
ronmental sustainability, yet broader motivating factors to do with in-
dustrial transformations involving issues of employment, ‘up-stream’ 
activities in manufacturing, value creation and trade patterns have so far 
been largely neglected in sustainability transitions studies [25]. 
Bringing an industrial policy lens to bear on sustainability transitions 
research is not only important for enhancing empirical and conceptual 
understandings of the broader factors that influence socio-technical 
transitions, but can potentially also play an important role in 
enhancing the feasibility of sustainability transitions through creating 
new industrial opportunities and minimising disruption [25,26]. 
Indeed, there are an increasing number of perspectives in energy 
debates and elsewhere that advocate that a form of green industrial 
policy is required for more rapid and just sustainability transitions to be 
realised [10,27-29]. With current policy discussions around a Green 
New Deal in both the USA and Europe [30,31] this position has become a 
fairly ubiquitous one around sustainability transitions. We find these 
arguments convincing and given the scale of the transformation required 
to meet CO2 emissions reductions targets across multiple systems [32], 
sustainability transitions will require significant industrial trans-
formation. However, while we have witnessed a variety of proposals for 
green industrial policies, so far there has been little attention in the 
sustainability transitions literature on what the role of industrial policy 
has been so far in transition processes. Additionally, there is a need to 
guard against a ‘one size fits all’ approach to industrial policy, and to 
appreciate the ‘variety’ of industrial policies in different national [33] 
and regional [2] contexts. This present analysis contributes to such an 
understanding. 
Empirically, we examine the perceptions that key stakeholders have 
had regarding the role of industrial policy in the low-carbon energy 
transitions of Germany, the UK, and Denmark. Based on our analysis, we 
discuss whether and how issues arising from these transitions may have 
influenced the ‘re-emergence’ of industrial policy in the European 
context. All three countries have seen a rapid increase in the share of 
renewables as energy sources in the electricity generation mix and, to a 
lesser extent, the energy mix. In 2019, renewable sources accounted for 
46% of electricity produced in Germany [34], 36.9% in the UK [35], and 
72% of in Denmark [36]. Yet, the technologies prioritised in the 
respective transitions and the implications and role of industry, jobs and 
skills in these transitions differ. 
Industrial policy can be characterised with certain fluidity and dif-
ficulties to draw exact boundaries, especially in cases where industrial 
policy has been left implicit and is realised via other sectoral policies, 
such as energy and innovation. Thus, our approach is exploratory in 
nature, seeking to shed light on industrial policy related factors and their 
role in the respective energy transitions by drawing on semi-structured 
expert interviews. First, we explore the different styles of industrial 
policy in the three case studies (RQ1). Second, we examine whether and 
how industrial policy has been perceived to enable or hinder low-carbon 
energy transitions (RQ2). 
Section 2 outlines the conceptual background on industrial policy 
literature and sustainability transitions, followed by our proposed 
analytical framework based on these literatures. Section 3 describes the 
empirical method. Our findings are presented in Section 4. Section 5 
discusses these findings regarding the different patterns of industrial 
policy for low-carbon transitions in each country. We then discuss the 
observed differences against sustainability transitions literature and the 
usefulness of the industrial policy lens. 
2. Conceptual background 
2.1. Industrial policy 
2.1.1. Traditional industrial policy and its rejuvenation 
Industrial policy is a broad term capturing different manifestations 
and forms of policy intervention [37,38]. At its broadest, industrial 
policy has been defined as “…a variety of public actions aimed at 
guiding and controlling the structural transformation process of an 
economy” ([39]: 3), and, more specifically, “policies by which govern-
ments attempt to shape the sectoral allocation of the economy” ([40]: 
43). Industrial policy can be explicit or implicit, intentional or unin-
tentional but, in effect it has typically meant that certain industries are 
favoured more than others [6]. Most countries pursue industrial policy 
through “any government decision, regulation or law that encourages 
ongoing activity or investment in an industry” ([41]: 23). In practice, 
this is likely to require elements of policies, such as visions, instruments 
and coordinated governance in different policy domains, such as 
educational, innovation, economic and financial policies, allowing in-
dustries to develop “economies of scale and become lowest cost pro-
ducers” ([41]: 25). 
The term industrial policy is a controversial one [4], stemming partly 
from fuzzy definitions, varying scope, normative questions, and 
differing applications between countries [39,41]. As Bosch ([42]: 7) 
argues, despite its resurgence, industrial policy is an ‘elusive’ term as 
“[u]nlike monetary policy, competition policy or trade policy, ‘indus-
trial policy lacks a clearly identifiable set of goals, policy instruments 
and institutions, such as a legislative framework to delineate the scope 
for industrial policy or designated agencies to execute it.” Indeed, we 
argue that industrial policy cannot be easily discerned through a simple 
identification of stated industrial policy but must be looked at in terms of 
identifying those policies, or mixes of policies, which may be of rele-
vance to the aim(s) of industrial policy. As such industrial policy lends 
itself to be systematised through the lens of policy mixes [43], with 
instrument mixes comprising both ‘vertical’ sectoral interventions and 
‘horizontal’ ones overlapping different policy domains and a broad range 
of actors. In addition, when it comes to ‘mission oriented’ industrial 
policy strategies [46], long term ‘guiding visions’ around shared goals 
and challenges are another crucial component in coordinating industrial 
development and transformation. 
Many facets of industrial policy are inspired by insights from the 
innovation systems approaches [47]. For example, some accounts of 
industrial policy pinpoint innovation policy and long-term strategic 
R&D support as key components of industrial policy [48]. Other ex-
amples concern the importance assigned to industrial clusters [49] and 
regions [2], collaborative links with research institutions and industry 
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[50], and coordination of industrial relations by governments [51]. 
These are all factors that are recognised as important in national inno-
vation systems approaches [52], explaining overlaps between industrial 
and innovation policy. 
National approaches towards industrial policy vary greatly. 
Andreoni ([33]: 246) states that “[t]he variation in countries’ industrial 
policy experiences is driven by their contextual — institutional and 
structural — and political economy differences as well as by the different 
policy space and rationales for government action.” Industrial policy 
varies in how industries are accounted for in regional and national 
strategies; the role and type of finance (e.g., in the presence of local and 
national banks); education and skills training policies; export-oriented 
policies; innovation policy such as public R&D support; and the role of 
trade unions in decision making. Thus, comparing industrial policies 
involves examining factors that relate to ‘varieties of capitalism’ liter-
ature [53,54]. 
The degree to which industrial policy has been used explicitly by 
policy makers is influenced by the broader economic context. Arguably, 
industrial policy fell somewhat out of favour from the 1980s onwards 
with the rise of ‘neoliberalism’ as a dominant form of economic ideol-
ogy, with industrial policy seen as a part of ‘inefficient’ government 
practices of ‘picking winners’. This gave way to privatisation and 
deregulation policies leading to increased governance through market 
mechanisms with ideological commitments for a minimal role for the 
state. 
However, as noted above, in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008, 
the renewed interest in industrial policy has been driven by two main 
factors. First, a need to re-stimulate growth and employment as a response 
to the economic crisis raising concerns over structural imbalances in the 
economy and the prevalence of market failures, recognising the political 
economy of market bail-outs, and the success of the emerging market 
economies [55]. Second, a number of societal objectives, such as moving 
towards low-carbon and resource efficient societies, have been con-
nected with the creation of a learning economy, addressing distribu-
tional issues and promoting employment [6]. For example, European 
Union (EU) industrial policy has been reconsidered in response to un-
employment and the decline of manufacturing [56] and given a recent 
sense of urgency in the context of economic recovery from the corona-
virus pandemic [57]. Further increasing interest towards mission- 
oriented innovation policy with potential to address societal chal-
lenges, such as accumulating plastics in oceans can be seen as a new 
boost for industrial policy [58]. As an example of the combination of 
these trends, the challenge of climate change has been coupled with 
opportunities to bolster employment and manufacturing around low- 
carbon innovation [59]. 
2.1.2. Green industrial policy and energy transitions 
In recent years, discussions around ‘green industrial policy’ have 
become increasingly prolific [11,27,60-62]. The idea is to promote more 
eco-efficient technologies addressing an environmental problem, while 
simultaneously bolstering competitiveness to deal with economic 
problems associated with deindustrialisation [63]. Indeed, energy 
transitions, entailing the adoption of new technologies and with long- 
term implications for the broader economy have been identified as 
being an important domain where ‘green industrial policy’ planning and 
intervention is required [12]. Green industrial policy seeks to build new 
industrial trajectories around the green economy and, thus, explicitly 
addresses environmental policy objectives. There is a recognition that 
green industries are often ‘infant industries’ that require additional 
support before they can become competitive with dominant technolo-
gies [64]. In this setting, strategic and coordinated industrial policy that 
supports green technologies and mitigates and manages labour market 
processes is seen as crucial [65]. For example, as low-carbon energy 
transitions gain momentum, industrial policy can help prepare for new 
kinds of jobs and skills that become necessary following the closure of 
carbon-intense incumbent industries. 
Pegels and Lütkenhorst [12] define green industrial policy as “gov-
ernment intervention to hasten the restructuring of the economy to-
wards environmental sustainability” and outline four factors of 
importance: inducing innovation, creating jobs, mitigating climate 
change, and minimising cost to consumers. They point out that inter-
national trade is a key consideration, with tariff protection, favourable 
customs and excise taxes, and ‘local content requirements’ representing 
potential instruments for protecting domestic manufacturing and 
fostering internationally competitive industries. A variety of policy in-
struments has been identified as green industrial policy. For example, 
Schwarzer [14] differentiates between regulatory and control mecha-
nisms, environmental taxes, industry protection, and industry support 
mechanisms. 
While policy mixes have been acknowledged to play a key role in 
governing sustainability transitions [20,66], industrial policy is seldom 
explicitly mentioned. However, through attention towards ‘creative’ 
and ‘destructive’ instruments in policy mixes [67] and ‘destabilisation’ 
of incumbent industries [24], more structural and directed processes of 
industrial change befit of industrial policy are gradually emerging. An 
example in this regard is the deliberate ‘phasing out’ or discontinuation 
of unsustainable technological trajectories [69]. 
There is some overlap therefore between the focus in sustainability 
transitions on promoting novel socio-technical developments through 
protection, nurturing, and the creation of new markets around for 
example, wind or solar technologies [70] and green industrial policy. 
However, there are also differences in terms of scope, goals, and di-
mensions. Sustainability transitions have tended to focus on down-
stream activities in a particular focal system and on promoting 
sustainable niches, a variety of actors, vision building from the 
perspective of sustainability and bottom-up developments. In transi-
tions, policy is only one of the system dimensions hindering or pro-
moting transitions. Instead, industrial policy has more emphasis on 
coordinated and long-term action by the state and is more attentive to 
‘upstream’ activities like manufacturing and ‘inter sectoral’ issues (for 
example, the implications of energy transitions for heavy industries) 
[25]; the goals are directed towards broader aims of creating a strong 
economy through job creation and retention, enhancing skills capacities, 
trade opportunities, and this reflects a broader set of dimensions under 
consideration where new actors are brought to the fore such as trade 
unions that have traditionally been neglected in sustainability transi-
tions research [71]. However, the two are increasingly connected by a 
growing attention in advancing transitions to phasing out incumbent 
and polluting industries [72] and a need for transformative [73] and 
mission-oriented policies [58] across sectors having an impact on the 
state of the environment. In the next section we expand on the elements 
of industrial policy we draw on to conduct our analysis. 
2.2. Elements of industrial policy 
In this research, we are not comparing the industrial policies of 
different nations in terms of a comprehensive literature-based or eco-
nomic evaluation as other studies have done [33,74]. Instead, we 
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examine what perceptions energy system actors have of the role that 
industrial policy has played in low-carbon energy transitions. To do so, 
we build on and identify a broad set of elements from the comparative 
work on “varieties of industrial policy” [33]. Given the well-recognised 
difficulties to identify a particular domain or set of policies that defi-
nitely constitute ‘industrial policy’ [42] and the recognised broader role 
of political cultures in shaping industrial policy [75], these elements 
enable a broad country comparison regarding different industrial policy 
styles. 
Varieties of industrial policy is a framework that “…reveals and 
contrasts emerging patterns and trends in industrial policy practices” 
([33]: 246). Focussed on the energy system, we do not go into the same 
level of detail as Andreoni, but rather build on the varieties approach to 
construct broad elements that are best suited to a comparative 
perspective and that are flexible enough to accommodate responses 
from interviewees in a semi-structured manner. We therefore refer to 
industrial policy styles in energy systems, which can be defined as the 
contrasting patterns of industrial visions, industrial policy instruments, in-
dustrial policy governance, and employment concerns and their perceived 
significance in energy transitions. We now discuss each of the elements 
that contributes to our focal point of interest in industrial policy styles. 
Three dimensions focussed on by Andreoni to compare the industrial 
policies of countries include ‘policy synchronisation and policy cycles’, 
‘policy packages’, and ‘policy governance models and coordination’. 
‘Policy synchronisation and policy cycles’ entails attention on the 
challenge of “synchronizing policies over time within each trans-
formation cycle” ([33]: 261). A transformation cycle involves a set of 
long-term policies that transcend different governments. Andreoni 
highlights that fundamental to synchronisation over this time period is 
coherence and a key structuring component of this coherence is the 
extent to which there is a coherent vision over the period of a trans-
formation cycle. This question of vision is key to industrial policy dis-
cussions. As Chang et al. point out, “one thing that comes out strongly 
through the review of industrial experiences in other countries is the 
importance of the national vision” ([76]: 46). Meanwhile, Mazzucato 
highlights the importance of a vision for industrial policy and the need 
for the state to “…provide the direction towards new “techno-economic 
paradigms”, which do not come about spontaneously out of market 
forces” [46] (122). The transformation cycle relates to ‘transitions’ and 
the concerted shift towards clean energy transitions that emerged in the 
1970 s and 1980 s. We are interested in the perceptions of interviewees 
in the extent to which there has been a coherent long-term vision with 
regards to the clean energy transition (entailing technology/component 
production and energy production from clean energy sources) in each 
country and the extent to which an industrial vision has been a part of 
the clean energy transition. We refer to this element as industrial 
visions. 
Second, Andreoni [33] identifies “policy packages” to compare in-
dustrial policies entailing the different instruments that can constitute 
industrial policy ranging from vertical interventions for particular sec-
tors or technologies such as direct subsidies or educational policies, to 
horizontal policies such as establishing multi-actor trade platforms 
around industrial growth [33,49,74]. The fuzzy definitions and cross- 
cutting nature of industrial policies make this an issue that is notori-
ously difficult to pin down given that certain ‘energy policy’ in-
terventions could also be part of an industrial agenda [12]. Similarly, 
there are striking similarities between national innovation policies and 
industrial policies [77]. This is a complex area for which we cannot go 
into to detail in this paper. For the purposes of the present analysis 
however, we follow Andreoni in recognising that instruments from 
‘innovation and technology policies’ constitute an industrial policy 
package [33]. A certain sub-set of policies, for example those aiming to 
create new regional industries, can be regarded as industrial innovation 
policy [2]. We refer to the element of industrial policy instruments 
when discussing and evaluating interviewee perceptions of what pol-
icies within energy are understood to be implicated in industrial policy. 
However, we also note the option of an industrial policy component of 
energy policy. 
Third, we draw on Andreoni’s focus on ‘policy governance models 
and coordination’ which is used to compare how industrial policies can 
vary based on whether policies are centrally planned at the national 
level or more decentralised among federal governance levels and a 
plurality of regional or state actors [33]. Municipalities and cities can 
also have a role in industrial policy formulation [78,79]. This element 
relates to broader differences between respective ‘qualities of de-
mocracy’ and the degree to which decision-making is centralised or 
decentralised in a particular country [80]. We refer to the element of 
industrial policy governance to interrogate the perceptions of stake-
holders with regards to how industrial policy enacted in the energy 
sector is facilitated based on these governance considerations. 
Andreoni also draws attention to a key policy instrument aimed at 
‘workers training’ [33]. Elsewhere, those writing on industrial policy in 
relation to energy have highlighted the importance of job creation and 
retraining as a prominent factor in energy transitions [12,71]. The 
element of employment concerns thus places attention to the extent to 
which job creation and sustaining skills in manufacturing or other sec-
tors play a role in a country’s energy transition. This focus on jobs is a 
central element of green industrial policy alongside the promotion of 
environmental technologies [81,82]. A distinguishing feature of energy 
policy having industrial policy dimensions is the existence of in-
struments put in place to utilise energy transitions for new job creation, 
skills retention, and ensuring positive benefits for manufacturing sectors 
and industries [12,83]. ‘Green industrial policy’ aims at garnering 
competitiveness, future skills, manufacturing and employment oppor-
tunities from clean energy transitions [84]. Furthermore, trade unions 
and their relative power in policy making processes can be important in 
determining the degree to which employment and skills are considered 
with regards to European energy transitions [33,74]. This can also be 
useful for comparing the industrial policy influence on respective na-
tional energy policies. We propose the element of employment concerns 
as a distinct one from more general industrial policy instruments to 
respond to the specific challenge of how to distinguish between energy 
policy and industrial policy. We argue the approach above provides a 
prudent means of ascertaining the degree to which considerations 
beyond just energy policy goals and related to industrial policy goals 
influence energy policy, enabling a parsimonious means of comparison. 
Table 1 
Interviewees per category in Germany, UK, and Denmark.  
Actor type Number of interviewees  
Germany UK Denmark Total 
Policy makers (incl. civil service) 3 4 7 14 
Industry associations, utilities 5 5 6 16 
Research, consultants 5 1 4 10 
Think tanks, NGO, trade unions 2 3 3 8 
Total 15 13 20 48  
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3. Research method 
We adopted a comparative country case study approach [85] to 
understand the interplay between industrial policy and low-carbon en-
ergy transitions via actor perceptions. Our principal research approach 
was an analysis of stakeholder perceptions of industrial policy and en-
ergy transitions in the case countries. Analyses involving different 
stakeholders are particularly suited to public problems that interconnect 
different sectors, people and organisations [86]. In this case, the analysis 
of perceptions was found more suitable than document analysis, as in-
dustrial policy, albeit existing in many countries in one form or another, 
is frequently implicit at the absence or in addition to formal industrial 
policy. As we noted earlier, industrial policy can be operationalised via 
policies labelled as innovation, education and even energy policies. We, 
thus, relied on the identification of knowledgeable experts in each 
country in the interface of industrial and energy policy, and their per-
ceptions of which policy goals and means can be accounted as industrial 
policy pertaining to the energy sector in their countries. Stakeholder 
perceptions reveal the image, cognitions and frames of reference that 
actors have about the policy and policy problems [87]. Thus, differing 
perceptions are likely to occur, while we undertake the more frequent 
occurrence of similar perceptions between interviewees to provide evi-
dence of a stronger finding of relevant policy issues. 
In-depth interviews were used as a primary data source, and aca-
demic literature and policy documents as supplementary data sources. A 
semi-structured interview guide was developed by the author group. 
Altogether 48 expert interviews were conducted during November 2016 
– March 2017 (see Table 1), conducted by three of the authors, each 
responsible for one country. Interviewees were selected to represent 
expertise in the energy sector covering different actor groups, including 
civil service and politics, utilities and industry associations, researchers 
and consultants, as well as non-governmental organisations, think tanks 
and trade unions. The interviews lasted 45–95 min and were recorded 
and transcribed. All non-English interview transcripts were translated 
into English. 
For each case study country, we also conducted a literature review on 
industrial policy and energy transitions. This resulted in a list of over 30 
peer-reviewed articles and reports, comprising contextual background 
information and enabling the triangulation of emerging research find-
ings. The time period under consideration is flexible given that exact 
timings of low-carbon energy transitions differ between countries and 
we were guided by interviewee interpretations of key events with 
regards to industrial policy and low-carbon energy transitions. However, 
with regards to data from the literature, we did not include information 
prior to the oil shock of 1973, as this is widely used as a critical juncture 
when discussing low-carbon energy transitions as it was after this point 
that many governments and other organisations explored alternative 
sources of energy more purposefully [88]. 
An initial coding framework was developed drawing on the literature 
review and refined based on initial interview analysis. This refinement 
was accomplished by four authors coding one interview individually, 
followed by a joint comparison of coding. This resulted in some alter-
ations to the list of codes and improved the interpretation of codes. To 
enhance the reliability of our analysis, we conducted two further rounds 
of comparative coding until a satisfactory level of mutual understanding 
of the codes and the coding procedure was achieved within the author 
group and a final list of codes was agreed upon. Subsequently the first 
author coded all transcribed interviews in NVivo. 
Following an initial coding and preliminary analysis of the in-
terviews, the most frequently used codes were selected for more sys-
tematic analysis using Excel. The first author summarised the key 
insights from each interview per selected code, also forming an inter-
pretation of the findings per code. Then, two other authors formulated 
their own interpretation for each code, allowing discussion regarding 
differing interpretations and meanings. Through this process, we 
generated a joint interpretation of overall findings for each country. 
As described above, we triangulated and complemented our inter-
view findings with the empirical literature. In a final analytical step, we 
focused on deriving the bigger picture and identifying overarching 
findings regarding our research questions. 
4. Findings 
In this section, we present our findings. We start by examining the 
Table 2 
Summary of industrial policy elements in low-carbon energy transitions.   
Germany UK Denmark 
Overall role Energiewende only partially regarded as industrial 
policy; conflicts between traditional and green 
industrial policy 
Industrial policy not recognised by interviewees as 
playing a significant role in energy transition, yet 
offshore wind and nuclear policy appear to be 
partially driven by industrial policy concerns 
Purposeful creation of new industrial base around 




Long-term vision towards a low-carbon, renewable 
energy system (without nuclear) includes 
competitiveness as primary objective; yet limited 
industrial vision regarding green industrial policy. 
Perceived lack of industrial vision regarding a new 
low-carbon energy system; yet nuclear and 
offshore wind prioritised, fitting with centralised 
vision of energy production. 
Strong long-term vision of energy transition and 
its potential for industrial growth, initiated by the 
Alternative Energy Plan with strong leadership by 




Co-existence of instruments protecting existing 
(energy-intensive) industry and support for 
renewable energy industry. 
Characterised by short-term chop and change 
policies, for many renewable energy sources and 
innovation. Contracts for Difference and ‘local 
content requirements’ for offshore wind; 35 year 
‘strike price’ for new nuclear. 
Mix of subsidies, taxes and employment and 
innovation focused instruments. 
Industrial policy 
governance 
Strong regional but also national responsibilities. Centralised decision making with a lack of regional 
industrial policy and regional political control 
more generally. 




Job creation in green technologies seen as one of 
several benefits of Energiewende, but also attention 
to job losses in polluting industries; Pro-transition 
and against-transitions trade unions. 
Employment not seen as a significant part of 
energy transition policy and discussion in the UK; 
trade unions not actively part of energy transitions. 
Job creation and reskilling initiatives seen as an 
important driver in Danish energy transition; 
trade unions actively involved via political 
strategies aiming for just transitions.  
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status of low-carbon energy transition and industrial policy in Germany, 
the UK and Denmark (Section 4.1). We then focus on actor perceptions 
of the role of industrial policy and its different elements on the low- 
carbon energy transition in each country (Section 4.2). Finally, we 
consider how industrial policy has been perceived both as an enabler 
and potential barrier to low-carbon energy transitions (section 4.3). 
4.1. Status of industrial policy 
For Germany, perceptions of the role that industrial policy plays 
more generally, definitions of what constitutes industrial policy, and the 
role of green industrial policy varied considerably among the in-
terviewees. Yet, in the UK, Germany is often cited as an exemplar 
country of successful industrial policy [89], and prominent economists 
note that “it is fair to say that it [Germany] has one of the most active in-
dustrial policies in Europe”([76]: 28). 
Four interviewees highlighted the broader issue of openly using the 
term ‘industrial policy’ in the German context. For example, industrial 
policy was highlighted as a “controversial paradigm - not controversial in 
doing so, but controversial in naming it” (DE11, Research). Similarly, it was 
referred to as a “very ideologically loaded term” (DE5, Think Tank). 
Another interviewee explained that “one has to be very careful” in using 
the term industrial policy given the high political value placed on the 
idea of a ‘free market’ (DE4, Utility). Yet another interviewee high-
lighted that politicians in Germany are “fearful” about stating they are 
pursuing an industrial policy in case it appears they are selecting 
“technological winners and losers” (DE3, Research). In effect, innovation 
policy was said to often be preferred as a term over industrial policy, 
while there “is still industrial policy behind.” (DE11, Research). 
For the UK, there was a perception shared between five interviewees 
that, for the past several decades, the UK has effectively had no indus-
trial policy: “I’m not convinced there really has been industrial strategy in 
the UK for probably kicking on for certainly more than my lifetime.” (UK2, 
Politician) and “the traditional British view, at least since the optimism of 
the ’60 s, has been: ‘We don’t do industrial policy. It just messes things up” 
(UK1, Research). This perceived lack of industrial policy and instead the 
dominance of a market-oriented approach is also recognised in the 
literature [90,91]. However, since the financial crisis of 2008, Berry 
[92] points out that there have been renewed policy discussions on in-
dustrial policy around concerns for ‘rebalancing’ the British economy, to 
address the decline of manufacturing, poor productivity and regional 
inequalities. Such issues have been under discussion to some extent by 
the Labour Party in 2009 and the coalition government since 2010. This 
has culminated in the elaboration of an explicit Industrial Strategy 
which was published in December 2017 [93] and was strengthened by 
discussions around the UK’s future in the context of Brexit, thereby 
putting industrial policy centre stage, including in the name of the 
responsible ministry ‘Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy (BEIS)’. 
Danish interviewees perceived that industrial policy had played a 
significant role in recent Danish energy transitions which is discussed in 
section 4.2.3. More broadly, Denmark is clearly identified as a country 
where in the 1970 s and 1980 s, “a revitalization of industrial policy” took 
place involving “…a greater directive role for the government” ([94]: 6). 
Campbell and Pedersen ([95]: 321) argue that “…Denmark embraced 
industrial policy” where, due to lacklustre performance of the Danish 
economy in the 1970 s, “the government devised an industrial policy aimed 
at improving the technological capacities and, therefore, the competitiveness 
of Danish firms in world markets”. However, this was fundamentally 
oriented around the kinds of procedures of ‘negotiative democracy’, 
comprising “an institutionalized strategic collaboration between various 
actors from the private sector and government—a discovery process where 
firms, unions, other interest groups, experts, and the state learn about costs 
and opportunities and then engage in strategic coordination” (ibid: 323). It is 
worth emphasising that such a policy approach stands in stark contrast 
to the former market-driven approach of the UK [50]. 
4.2. Perceived role of industrial policy and its elements in low-carbon 
energy transitions 
We now turn to presenting our findings on stakeholder perceptions 
regarding the role of industrial policy in low-carbon energy transitions 
in Germany, the UK and Denmark, differentiating between the elements 
of industrial policy set out in section 2.3. For each country we summa-
rize the key points in Table 2 and provide illustrative quotes in the 
Annex. 
4.2.1. Germany 
Interviewee responses regarding the role that industrial policy has 
played in the German energy transition were nuanced but can be divided 
into two broad perspectives. One perspective was that the German en-
ergy transition was an example of green industrial policy through 
stimulating German industry towards a green economy (five in-
terviewees). For example, one interviewee noted that the role industrial 
policies had played in the Energiewende was “a very central one”, where 
the government had intervened to “deliberately build up an industry” 
(DE3, Think Tank). This is in line with the prior literature [12,96]. Five 
interviewees emphasised that policies aimed at protecting existing 
energy-intensive industries (e.g. via exemptions from renewables sur-
charges) also was a key aspect of how the German energy transition 
could be seen as entailing industrial policy measures. A second broad 
perspective covering eight interviewees was that the German Ener-
giewende policy is first and foremost energy policy although may have 
“industrial policy effects” (DE15, Trade Union). Within this second group, 
a range of factors were discussed. For one interviewee, there is “no in-
dustrial policy in the energy sector” (DE8, Industry Association). Another 
pointed to a lack of industrial policy in the case of the difficulties 
experienced by solar power with competition from China and contrasted 
Germany’s approach to solar with China’s state-led and subsidy-led 
approach (DE7, Research). Another interviewee, recognising the 
controversial nature of the term, emphasised that the Energiewende set 
“framework conditions” to enable competition and investment rather 
than being industrial policy (DE12, Ministry). So, while Germany is seen 
as a country where the state has played a key role in influencing the 
directionality of industry and the economy [45], within Germany there 
seems to be reluctance to acknowledge this as industrial policy, high-
lighting that perspectives on the role of industrial policy in German 
energy are complex. 
Pertaining to industrial visions in Germany’s energy transition seven 
interviewees highlighted the importance of a long-term vision to tran-
sition away from a centralised energy system predominantly based on 
coal and nuclear towards a more decentralised, low-carbon renewable 
energy system, a vision rooted in societal movements in the 1980 s 
criticism of nuclear power and advocacy for renewable alternatives. This 
vision is encapsulated in the Energiewende and seen as providing 
guidance for industry. However, the vision does not explicitly include a 
green industrial policy component but rather more generally fore-
grounds industry competitiveness as one of the main policy objectives. 
One interviewee pointed out that “the writing has been on the wall for so 
long” with regards to the shift to renewables and energy efficiency (DE5, 
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Think Tank), whereas another highlighted that “industry has fully 
accepted the Energiewende, participated in it, picked it up” (DE13, Minis-
try). Thus, there was evidence that interviewees perceived that there 
was coherence with regards to the direction of the energy sector, argu-
ably befitting of industrial policy. Indeed, long-term visions are an 
important part of ‘mission oriented’ industrial policy and Mazzucato 
refers to the German energy transition as a ‘model’ example ” ([97]: 14). 
However, while it seems that a long-term vision of the Energiewende 
and the associated multi-actor consensus was vital in driving the initial 
stages of industrial shifts towards a green economy, in terms of more 
recent developments, four interviewees identified a lack of strategic 
vision around the next stages of the energy transition. They remarked 
that, in relation to important decisions on future trajectories and in-
dustrial policy decisions around key issues such as the roll out of electric 
vehicles, the current government is “fearful of visions… and are extremely 
fearful, especially in Germany, of introducing some sort of modern planned 
economy” (DE3, Research). 
The industrial policy instruments identified by interviewees ranged 
from instruments aimed at protecting existing industries to those pro-
moting new technological trajectories. Nine interviewees highlighted 
the role that the surcharge exemption of the Renewable Energy Sources 
Act (EEG)1 has played in protecting existing energy intensive industries, 
such as the steel and chemical industry, from the additional costs created 
by the support for renewable energy through the Feed-in-Tariff system. 
As stated by one interviewee “…you have to see that the competitive 
conditions fit somehow and the burden does not become too big there, because 
the logic from an environmental perspective is: the material is needed, not 
only for the Energiewende, but also for other sectors” (DE12, Ministry). 
Export promotion was identified by five interviewees as an important 
coordination instrument utilised to promote new green technologies. 
The importance of public R&D support as an aspect of industrial policy 
was discussed by five interviewees. For example, one interviewee 
commented that “you want to nurture perhaps a technological innovation 
system. If you look at it from that point of view you see that there are 
numerous policy instruments… [including]…the classical R&D support” 
(DE11, Research). In addition to measures to protect existing industries, 
export promotion, and R&D support, the literature identifies other in-
dustrial policy instruments utilized in Germany, but that were generally 
not addressed by the interviewees in the context of industrial policy. 
These include loan programmes for solar and wind, sector specific 
innovation cluster support programmes and the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act (EEG) with its FiTs [83], although particularly the latter 
raise the point of the difficulty in delineating between what is energy 
policy and what is industrial policy. 
In relation to industrial policy governance the literature on German 
industrial policy stresses the importance of embedded institutional 
structures of finance, employer associations, universities and research 
centres coordinating at the regional level for Germany’s industrial pol-
icy [33]. However, these institutional characteristics which are identi-
fied as key in understanding Germany’s approach to industrial policy 
[6,33] were not discussed extensively by interviewees. Only two in-
terviewees spoke about the importance of the regional level for indus-
trial and structural policies being introduced for particular regions in the 
context of the Energiewende. Offshore wind was mentioned as a prime 
example, with regional attempts to promote infrastructure and indus-
trial clusters. In this context, one interviewee reckoned that in order to 
facilitate structural change you cannot rely on the market alone but “you 
need exactly this kind of industrial and structural policy” (DE15, Union). 
Finally, regarding employment concerns eight interviewees dis-
cussed the role of jobs and trade unions for the German low-carbon 
energy transition. Five interviewees perceived the importance of the 
creation of new jobs through the building up of a renewables industry as 
an important aspect of the German energy transition. Five interviewees 
also mentioned the importance of securing jobs in the face of the energy 
transition in relation to coal and other industries. Within this discussion, 
the differing positions of trade unions were emphasised as an important 
dimension. This is reflected by the difference between IG Metall as a 
union firmly on board with the Energiewende and other unions, such as 
those representing lignite mining, coal power production and energy 
intensive industries, who take a more critical stance (noted by four in-
terviewees). In Germany, trade unions are an important factor in how 
industrial policy operates, where long-established societal agreements 
including the Works Constitution Act and the Collective Bargaining Law 
enable “work councils to get involved in firms’ strategic decisions regarding 
the introduction of new technologies or organisations” ([76]: 25), which 
contrasts with the degree of engagement unions have elsewhere. The 
literature further discusses a number of embedded policies in place 
around sustaining skills in manufacturing through public expenditure 
[50], but while considered key to German industrial policy these were 
not mentioned by interviewees. 
4.2.2. UK 
Regarding the role of industrial policy, there was general consensus 
that industrial policy had not played a role in UK low carbon energy 
transitions (mentioned by seven interviewees). One interviewee pin-
pointed the role of the UK treasury and that it had “…constantly set its 
face against the notion that we should have regional or industrial strategy” 
(UK 8, Think Tank). Five interviewees identified the lack of industrial 
policy as symptomatic of the liberalised approach to energy policy 
which had dominated with the emphasis on ‘not picking winners’. A 
Civil Servant noted that “the current policy in the last 20 years has always 
been to use markets to drive the existing [energy] system…the government’s 
approach is to do much the same” (UK 11, Ministry). Three interviewees 
noted that support for many renewables had been short lived with 
policies implemented in 2010 radically reduced in 2015 causing deep 
uncertainty for the renewables industry. However, offshore wind is an 
area where industrial policy has been present, while only one inter-
viewee alluded to this. Despite originally being the most expensive 
technology, offshore wind was supported strategically since the mid- 
2000s. Along with government subsidies, support for offshore wind 
has included measures to encourage manufacturing of blades for 
offshore wind turbines to boost ‘green jobs’ [98], plans for boosting 
skills in an offshore wind industrial strategy [99], and more recently, 
more interventionist policies to implement ‘local content requirements’ 
[100]. Additionally, since 2007, the UK Government has strongly sup-
ported the construction of new nuclear power [101] ostensibly as part of 
a low-carbon strategy but with a clear priority around ‘maintaining the 
nuclear supply chain’ and protecting UK nuclear jobs and building up 
British nuclear skills [102-104]. 
One of the most unanimous points that stood out was agreement 
amongst eight interviewees of a lack of or unclear industrial vision in 
terms of long-term planning around the what industries should be pri-
oritised for low carbon transitions with an emphasis on ‘not picking 
winners’. An interviewee remarked that “I think there’s a lack of vision, 
and a lack of understanding of how everything fits together” (UK8, Utility). 
Another interviewee specified that there was a lack of vision in relation 
to renewables, and the UK system remained based around a ‘centralised’ 
vision of energy production, where “[o]ur electricity policy is essentially 
dominated by the need to perceive these, by the policy makers, to basically 
base our electricity system around a relatively small number of relatively 
large generating sets, which hasn’t changed since the ‘50 s” (UK9, Think 
Tank). Despite the UK having one of the first legally binding climate 
change targets in the world with the Climate Change Act [105], insti-
tutional problems of short termism and a ‘stop start’ approach to policy 
has been noted in the literature [106]. This is exemplified by the sudden 
changes in 2015 to Feed-in-Tariff’s and other measures, which have had 
the effect of reducing investment in UK renewables by half by 2017 
[107]. 
1 As part of the EEG mechanism established in 2000, energy-intensive in-
dustries were exempted from paying the full surcharge to promote renewables. 
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In relation to industrial policy instruments, the interviewees did not 
mention the various measures taken around offshore wind or nuclear, 
and the Feed-in-Tariff schemes established in 2010 were not discussed in 
the context of industrial policy. Where four interviewees did see more 
proactivity in terms of industrial policy was in R&D and innovation 
activities. While it was noted that UK R&D support had fallen to very low 
levels in the 2000 s, in the last several years, “there has been a succession 
of institutes set up”, including the ‘energy catapult’ (UK 1, Research). 
Relating to industrial policy governance, seven interviewees high-
lighted that UK governance was centralised and there was a lack of 
control at the regional level. One interviewee stated that “in many other 
European countries there is actually a lot of activity at the regional level… 
Treasury governance on public finance, which gutted local authority, has 
meant you’ve taken out a whole layer of experimentation, innovation, 
development that’s available in other European countries” (UK9, Think 
Tank). During the first decade of the 21st century, the New Labour 
Government sought to develop a regional industrial strategy. One 
interviewee remarked that “there were institutional frameworks being 
created under Labour…which were about, really, creating a low-carbon in-
dustrial strategy” where “prominence were given to particular regions” and 
“strong, well-funded institutions” (UK6, NGO)2. However, in 2010, “these 
were scrapped” (UK6, NGO) when the Conservative Party came to power. 
The same interviewee did point to one lasting success story that survived 
this disruption, however: the Siemen’s turbine blade factory built on the 
Humber Side involving local stakeholders in planning and attracting 
Siemens to invest in the region. The centralised nature of UK governance 
is recognised in the literature, and different experiments aimed at 
enhancing regional powers over the past few decades, removed when a 
new party comes to power, seem to be a trend [108]. 
Most interviewees did not have much to say regarding employment 
concerns. However, a union member specialised in the area of low- 
carbon policy pointed out the significant difference between the UK 
and other European countries in terms of union engagement: in terms of 
unions being consulted with regards to energy policy decision making 
and industrial implications “there isn’t very much… I mean, there is ad hoc 
stuff that goes on between government and unions. There is routine contact 
between government and industry, there is patchy stuff” (UK7, Trade 
Union). This perspective is backed up by analysis comparing the ‘vari-
eties of capitalism’ of different countries and the different roles afforded 
to unions in the decision making process [109,110]. In a review of union 
engagement across Europe the ETUC notes that the UK is a country 
where unions reported that they were often not involved in discussions 
on decarbonisation strategies3. 
4.2.3. Denmark 
Eight interviewees perceived that industrial policy had played a role 
in stimulating Danish low-carbon energy transition. One interviewee 
said that a focus early on was on creating the “industrial base” around 
wind energy, which “created a strong industry” (DK 20, Utility). Four 
interviewees acknowledged the particular role of politicians in directing 
strategic decisions within industry, particularly the Environment Min-
ister Svend Auken in the 1990s. Politicians were pivotal in kick-starting 
the Danish Offshore wind industry where companies like Elsam and 
Energie 2, whose assets were mainly fossil fuel plants, were forced to 
change their industrial trajectory: “it was not the companies who wanted to 
do it. It was an obligation from governments who forced them to do it, and 
then they had to figure out how to handle it of course” (DK 1, Utility). 
Eight interviewees mentioned the importance of the Danish Green 
industrial vision emerging from the anti-nuclear movement and the 
formation of the ‘Alternative Energy Plan’ which was important in 
setting the agenda of what the low-carbon industrial trajectory would 
follow: “in the ‘70s and until 1985, where there was a decision in parliament 
not to have nuclear power, until then it was still open for what kind of path we 
should take. But, once a decision was taken in 1985…At that point in time it 
was clear we would be doing something else” (DK 11, Ministry). Specif-
ically, in relation to the offshore wind industry, four interviewees 
mentioned that particular politicians had ambitions about the potential 
for the creation of an industry and were influential in pushing this 
vision: “it was decided sometime in the 1990s to try to go for offshore wind” 
(DK1, Utility). The long-term nature of Danish political decisions related 
to green policy is quite remarkable, where “the successful take off of the 
Danish wind power industry since the mid-1980s was the result of the 
Government’s consistent support of and investment in wind power 
technology since the 1970 s” representing a “long-term vision and 
consistent policy framework”[111] . 
A number of industrial policy instruments were recognised by the 
interviewees as being part of what could be considered as an industrial 
policy approach to low-carbon energy transitions. This includes subsidy 
schemes to expand district heating (DK2, Research), early taxes intro-
duced on fossil fuels (DK 11, Ministry), grants for manufacturers of 
turbines in the early years (DK 17, Industry Association), and subsidies 
for offshore wind facilities and long-term R&D including test stations for 
wind developments (3 interviewees). According to the literature, the key 
motivation behind these instruments was “to build a globally competi-
tive hub for creating innovative wind energy technology and highly paid 
jobs.” ([112]: 29). 
Regarding industrial policy governance, the main theme was the 
governance changes which had occurred during the last decade or so. 
Since 2007, changes have been made to the regions in Denmark, 
transforming 11 regions into five, with the perception being that more 
power was shifted to the state level. The regions have no tax raising 
powers themselves and are funded by the state and municipalities. As a 
result of these changes, “[t]he regions do not have a very strong role in 
energy” (DK8, Ministry). Further, the ‘total planning’ system changed in 
which regions previously played a bigger role: “[w]hen there came a new 
[liberal/right-wing] government…they didn’t want this planning system 
because they saw that it meant…a national district plan, socialistic planning 
system. They destroyed it totally” (DK 8, Ministry). This contrasts with the 
historical role for regions in heat policy: “They had a role in the heat 
planning business before, but otherwise, they have not really had a very big 
role in energy. It’s been mostly on the municipal level. But, I regard it as 
something that is missing” (DK 2, Research). From the interviewees re-
sponses, it seems that the role of regions in industrial policy and energy 
is limited while municipalities have a key role in energy, yet it was not 
clear what bearing municipalities have on industrial policy. 
Seven interviewees brought forward issues linking to employment 
concerns. The issue of the provision of jobs through renewable energy 
was a key part of Denmark’s post 1970 s industrial policy [113]. The role 
of jobs had a positive impact on support for the overall energy transition 
where “wind turbines were developed by local manufacturers and created a 
lot of jobs so there was quite a drive towards wind power in the local com-
munities” (DK 17, Industry Association). Sustaining manufacturing and 
skills was therefore a key priority. As one interviewee outlined, “we had 
a good argument. Especially [that] the windmill industry is a job for metal-
workers…we also produce it in what you call the outskirts of the country.” 
(DK 19, Politician). With the drive to shift Danish energy companies 
away from fossil fuels, there is also evidence of attention towards 
enabling workers in fossil fuel industries to maintain employment. One 
interviewee noted that, in the period in which DONG decided to 
2 This was the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) where the plan was to 
have different regions focussed on areas of industrial expertise for the low- 
carbon economy. For example, while the West Midlands were to lead on elec-
tric vehicles, the North East was to be focussed on offshore wind. Regional 
Development Agencies (RDAs) were abolished by the incoming Conservative 
Party as part of the ‘Localism Agenda’.  
3 “In some Member States, TUs are still not consulted on climate & energy 
policy issues. Trade union representatives from the United Kingdom, Greece 
and Malta have, for example, indicated that they have not been involved in 
discussions related to their national long-term decarbonisation strategies.” ([1 
4 6]: 14). 
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transform into a green utility company, they made a large effort, sup-
ported by the Ministry and the trade unions, to transfer highly skilled 
engineers related to fossil fuels to a new part of the company. However, 
for some jobs this was not possible and these skilled workers were 
transferred to other energy projects around the world: “this was the way 
we eventually made the transition work so there was not too much resistance” 
(DK 1, Utility). The strong role of unions and Danish commitments to 
just transitions as part of a clean energy strategy is something that is 
strongly noted by international observers and trade unions in other 
countries [114,115]. Five interviewees highlighted that early involve-
ment of trade unions in discussions around jobs in wind energy. 
4.3. Industrial policy as enabler or barrier of low-carbon energy 
transitions 
In this third results section we portray our findings regarding 
whether certain elements of industrial policy, or a perceived lack of 
industrial policy, have acted as an enabler or barrier to low-carbon en-
ergy transitions. 
4.3.1. Industrial policy as an enabler of low-carbon energy transitions 
In Denmark and Germany, there was evidence from interviewees 
that industrial policy had played an enabling role in low-carbon energy 
transitions. Four out of 15 German interviewees expressed that indus-
trial policy was an enabler of the initial energy transformation. Addi-
tionally, there was a recognition that while there may not have been an 
overt industrial policy angle to the Energiewende, there were “industrial 
policy effects” (DE13, Trade Union), such as job creation. In contrast, 
Danish interviewees broadly recognised that prioritisation around job 
creation had played an enabling role in low-carbon transitions in 
Denmark, including the key political role of the government and trade 
unions. It was emphasised by interviewees that not only did this create 
an industrial base that could construct a low-carbon energy industry, but 
this ensured a societal consensus around low-carbon transitions. 
Despite the UK’s rapid growth in renewables capacity in recent years, 
industrial policy was not regarded as an enabling factor for this low- 
carbon energy transition. Most interviewees highlighted a past lack of 
industrial policy. At the same time, four interviewees pointed towards 
the rapid reversal in UK policy regarding policy support measures for 
renewables and energy efficiency in 2015 to highlight a lack of long- 
term industrial vision which created uncertainty in terms of invest-
ment decisions. 
4.3.2. Industrial policy as a barrier to low-carbon energy transitions 
In the literature there is much discussion around the importance of 
industrial policy to accelerate low-carbon transitions [27,28,65]. How-
ever, industrial policies can also relate to protective measures for 
incumbent industries. 
In the German case, a key theme that emerged related to the balance 
between policy instruments designed to protect incumbents from the 
adverse effects of the transition to renewable energies, such as increased 
costs, and instruments designed to support new green industries. One 
interviewee pointed out these are the “two sides” of industrial policy 
(DE5, Think Tank). Seven interviewees in Germany alluded to the pace 
of the German energy transition being slowed down due to industrial 
policy concerns. That is, it was argued that resistance by industrial trade 
associations, trade unions, and particular sectors based around argu-
ments for the protection of German industry and jobs potentially caused 
a blockage to a more accelerated transition, for example through 
exemptions from the EEG surcharge. As one interviewee argued: “There 
are going to be winners and losers. The losers – the steel industry, the chemical 
industry, the nonferrous industry, to name a few examples –are politically 
very strong”, leading to “…a giant discrepancy between the stated political 
aims, the noble pronouncements and the measures taken.” (DE 2, Govern-
ment Ministry). 
For the UK, the previous lack of industrial policy was identified as a 
barrier to more accelerated deployment of renewable energy. Also, the 
lack of industrial strategy was associated as an important dimension in 
the ‘lack of vision’ around a different energy paradigm, with a constant 
chopping and changing of policy direction creating uncertainty. Addi-
tionally, in terms of the recent shift to an overt ‘industrial strategy’, the 
interviewees noted that the industrial strategy appears to be more about 
lowering costs for existing industries rather than promoting new tech-
nological trajectories. 
In terms of barriers, four Danish interviewees raised concerns that 
the increasing strategic importance of the wind industry to Denmark 
and the strong levels of state control in facilitating this industrial 
expansion, has centralised production into the hands of a few large 
companies. The industrial expansion and improvements in production 
methods assisted by the State through the provision of test fields and 
R&D has seen the traditional local production and local ownership 
models challenged, with increasing conflict around siting and financial 
remunerations from wind power production. For some, the increased 
steering and involvement of the state in the wind industry of Denmark 
represents a centralising process challenging some of the original 
grassroots and decentralised approaches that motivated the Danish en-
ergy transition originally. This may not have a bearing on C02 emission 
reductions but rather may challenge broader values entailed in Danish 
energy transitions. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
In this section we discuss the perceived role of industrial policy in 
low-carbon energy transitions and how this differed between the three 
countries (for an overview, see Table 1). 
5.1. Implicit industrial policy in German energy transitions 
We argue that German industrial policy in the context of the Ener-
giewende can best be described as ‘implicit industrial policy’. We have 
chosen this notion because, while in the literature it is recognised that 
Germany has had an industrial policy [65] particularly with regards to 
its manufacturing sector [89], a theme that emerged in the interviews 
was that it is not often publicly named as being industrial policy and that 
the preferred terminology is ‘competitiveness’. Thus, Germany has 
pursued some form of industrial policy without it being named as such. 
In the literature, Germany’s industrial policy in general is characterised 
by its stakeholder financing system including national and regional in-
vestment banks and ‘patient capital’, the Diversified Quality Production 
(DQP) system and wage bargaining systems, the key role of the ‘Mit-
telstand’, a publicly-subsidised vocational training system for skills, 
dense-inter corporate networks, and the role of the Fraunhofer Society 
[50,91,116,117]. However, such factors were not mentioned by our 
interviewees, suggesting a level of embeddedness whereby industrial 
trajectories in Germany are guided strongly by institutional conditions 
in keeping with notions of Germany as a ‘coordinated economy’ [118]. 
This form of embedded and implicit industrial policy may also point 
towards understanding the challenges of accelerating structural change 
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towards low-carbon trajectories. An indirect effect of phasing out coal 
on energy intensive industries such as steel and aluminium may be an 
initial increase in electricity prices due to the merit order effect. This 
might be one of the reasons why in the context of coal phase out dis-
cussions, these powerful industries and unions sometimes argue that 
phasing out coal could threaten Germany’s international competitive-
ness. Also, unions in the coal sector itself, although now having a rela-
tively small membership compared to other sectors, also have a 
significant role in particular regions in Germany regarding the speed of 
the coal phase out [71,119]. Therefore, Germany has agreed a rather 
slow coal phase out entailing evolving structural and regional policies to 
manage job losses and broader economic impacts [120]. The strong 
automotive sector is also likely to be a key site where the speed of the 
next phase of Germany’ energy transition [72] will be tested. 
5.2. Hidden to overt industrial policy in UK energy transitions 
Since the 1980 s the UK had relinquished an active industrial policy 
in favour of market-oriented ‘competitiveness’ drives [121]. Addition-
ally, the UK’s political system which is very centralised has been a 
barrier to regional industrial policy, and effort in introducing regional 
industrial policy under Labour largely failed. In addition, unlike in 
Germany or Denmark trade unions have often been excluded from en-
ergy policy decision making in the UK [109]. Therefore, it may not be 
surprising that the majority of UK interviewees did not perceive indus-
trial policy playing a role within the low-carbon energy transition in the 
UK. Yet, it does seem that industrial policy concerns were influencing 
government support for particular technologies above others. From an 
early stage, despite being more expensive than other low-carbon op-
tions, offshore wind was prioritised by the government with an emphasis 
on building a UK supply chain and with strong policy support and co-
ordination by Government [122]. 
This has included establishing ‘local content requirements’ to in-
crease the share of British companies in the offshore supply chain. In 
addition, from 2006 onwards, an emphasis on supporting the develop-
ment of British nuclear skills and capabilities through a new civil nuclear 
programme has been pursued by successive governments. This emphasis 
on nuclear has intensified in recent years with an intense prioritisation 
around sustaining the UK nuclear industrial base [103,104,123]. Given 
that at the same time support has been significantly reduced for other 
low-carbon technologies that are shown by the government’s own fig-
ures to be more cost-effective than nuclear and offshore wind [124,125], 
it can be concluded that the UK government has to a certain extent, 
sought to pick winners. Yet, this would not be expressed by the gov-
ernment because of overarching commitments to liberalisation and ‘not 
picking winners’[126]. Hence, we refer to this as hidden industrial 
policy. More recently however, the UK changed course, seeing the 
emergence of a much more overt ‘industrial strategy’, responding to the 
decline in UK manufacturing, low productivity levels, and significant 
regional inequalities, based around efforts to ‘rebalance’ the UK econ-
omy including a clean growth strategy, increased R&D spend, and 
‘sector deals’ which are evolving at the time of writing [127,128]. 
5.3. Direct industrial policy in Danish energy transitions 
The Danish energy transition is synonymous with the notions of a 
bottom-up transformation because of the vital role played by social 
movements, citizens, and local manufacturers in the 1970 s and 1980 s 
in changing the trajectory of the Danish energy system [129]. Perhaps 
less well known, is the crucial role played by direct intervention by 
visionary politicians to influence industrial trajectories which emerged 
as a key theme in our interviews. This included ‘forcing’ companies to 
transfer more quickly to wind energy production in the 1990 s through 
striking deals, alongside long-term and stable market intervention to 
promote wind turbine manufacturer and production. The role of the 
Danish state was therefore crucial. However, again in contrast to the UK 
and a lesser extent Germany, this may relate to political-economic fac-
tors which enabled politicians to take a more interventionist stance, 
given that many utilities were publicly owned in Denmark at the time 
and there was broad societal support for such a transition [130]. In 
contrast to the UK, trade unions play a central role in Danish political 
life, where two thirds of workers are in trade unions and the Danish case 
is often held as an example of a just transition – in simultaneously 
protecting and creating new secure jobs while undertaking a green 
transition. The latter stages of industrial policy were associated by some 
interviewees as contributing to a perceived ‘re-centralisation’ of Danish 
energy policy with priorities set around supporting the offshore wind 
industry and larger infrastructure which may contrast with the more 
localised imaginaries that were influential in the initial stages of the 
Danish energy transition. 
In our approach, we focused on perceptions that key energy sector 
stakeholders had on the connection of industrial policy and energy 
transitions. It, thus, did not conduct a thorough top-down analysis of 
policy mixes in each country. Structured policy mapping exercises and 
the development of policy mixes pertaining to the field of industrial 
policy would be an interesting area of further research, and one 
requiring a more detailed identification of boundaries and overlaps 
between the industrial policy domain and other policy domains. This is 
likely to become an increasingly relevant avenue of research as indus-
trial policy takes centre stage in the context of Green New Deal plans and 
economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. 
5.4. Concluding Remarks: The importance of studying industrial policy in 
low-carbon energy transitions 
This paper has revealed different styles of industrial policy in energy 
transitions, outlining differences between perceptions of key energy 
sector actors regarding the role of industrial policy, and what is un-
derstood in key literatures and policy. In Germany, an unease at the use 
of the term ‘industrial policy’ due to its ideological implications was 
clear, despite the German case often being heralded as an example of 
green industrial policy driving the energy transition. In the UK, indus-
trial policy was not recognised by interviewees as playing a role with 
broader commitments to liberalisation and ‘not picking winners’ cited. 
Yet, interventionist policies around offshore wind and prioritisations 
around nuclear employment and capabilities highlight that industrial 
policy related factors have been important in driving long-term policy 
for those particular technologies. Meanwhile, Denmark exhibited a more 
open approach to industrial policy were decisive political intervention 
was accepted as playing a key role in shifting the direction of the energy 
industry towards a low-carbon trajectory. Thus, rather than discrete and 
identifiable policy instruments, industrial policy is clearly influenced by 
the very different political cultures present in these countries. Thus, 
applying lessons across countries of what type of industrial policy 
‘works’ may be challenging because industrial policy may more often 
than not, be about institutionally embedded governance styles rather 
than any overtly stated policy. 
We have outlined, using four elements of industrial policy to guide 
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our analysis (industrial visions, industrial policy instruments, industrial 
policy governance and employment concerns), the different ways in 
which industrial policy has been pursued in relation to energy in the 
three countries. As well as identifying differing industrial policy styles in 
different countries, the interviewees identified aspects of industrial 
policy as both enabling but at times hindering low-carbon energy 
transitions. This suggests that rather than being a panacea for acceler-
ating low-carbon energy transitions, diverse consequences may result 
from the resurgence of industrial policy that call for a closer examination 
of the particular mix of policies in a given industrial policy context. The 
number of decisions already made by governments to phase-out old 
technologies (and industries) has increased the importance of employ-
ment concerns as part of emerging just transitions frameworks. 
A key issue relates to what one interviewee identified as the ‘two 
sides’ of the industrial policy coin in terms of the balance between 
policies aimed at protecting existing industries and jobs, and policies 
aimed at promoting newer technological trajectories and job opportu-
nities. This chimes with work in sustainability transitions which is 
attentive to the creative and destructive elements in policy mixes and 
how such a balance is constituted [131]. With an enhanced role of the 
state, there is well-known risk of ‘regulatory capture’ in relation to in-
dustrial policy where vested interests gain enhanced support from the 
state while newer industries may struggle to receive similar levels of 
support [132]. Examples of this were suggested by interviewees and in 
the literature, including the German car industry, coal industry, and the 
nuclear sector in the UK. Therefore, a focus on horizontal coordination 
measures and including a diversity of industrial actors in decision- 
making around industrial policy to avoid regulatory capture is an 
important concern as industrial policy gains traction in the context of 
Green New Deal discussions in Europe and beyond. 
Another important difference amongst the cases is that there has 
been more disruption of existing business models, energy companies, 
and dominant grid design paradigms in Germany than the UK, with new 
actors and forms of ownership (such as energy cooperatives) having 
emerged in Germany, reducing the market share of incumbents, while in 
the UK major utilities still dominate the energy market and the role of 
new actors like cooperatives remains marginal [133,134]. Similarly, in 
Denmark, significant changes in ownership in the energy system 
occurred that could be considered ‘disruptive’ of ‘established networks 
of power’ [135]. However, focussing on disruption more broadly, it 
could be argued that industrial policy decisions in Denmark included 
efforts to sustain jobs, for example by actively retaining skills and ca-
pacities related to offshore oil activities within the emerging wind in-
dustry, lessened the disruptive effects of transitions. Similarly, 
Germany’s much criticised agreements for coal phase out by 2038, 
negotiated with companies, unions, regions and other stakeholders can 
be seen as a policy intervention to manage structural decline [136,137]. 
This may contrast with the adversarial approach taken with coal mining 
closure in the UK which continues to have significant disruptions in 
terms of poverty rates and a range of social indicators in former coal 
mining regions in the UK in the absence of significant industrial policy 
interventions [138]. Thus, it seems apparent that industrial policy 
measures have in some cases stimulated systemic disruption but, have 
also been drawn upon to mitigate against other dimensions of disruption 
in Germany and Denmark. 
Another point of relevance to sustainability transitions is how the 
directionality of energy transitions may be influenced by industrial 
policy concerns. This relates to industrial variety and how the direc-
tionality of industrial policy is influenced by existing industrial 
capabilities. For example, while our interviewees did not discuss 
biomass with regards to industrial policy in Denmark, it was signifi-
cantly supported since the 1980 s and built on existing agricultural ca-
pabilities to build a domestic industry [139]. Similarly, the Danish 
offshore wind industry built on existing capabilities and infrastructures 
around offshore oil and gas [140]. This has been observed elsewhere, in 
terms of ‘technological overlaps’ between fossil fuel industries and new 
renewable industries [26]. Solar, on the other hand, was a technology 
that did not initially receive significant support from the Danish gov-
ernment and was a technology where existing industrial capabilities 
were perhaps not as pronounced. However, the UK also had significant 
capacities in the offshore oil and gas sector which may have also influ-
enced its prioritisation of offshore wind, however so the UK did not 
manage to build significant UK content with regards to an offshore wind 
manufacturing industry [141,142]. Further research in sustainability 
transitions could explore how technological overlaps influence direc-
tionality in transitions, which raises significant issues regarding defini-
tions and relations between ‘niche’ and ‘regime’ developments [21]. 
While our discussions have focussed more on the aspect of stimulating 
the creation of new industries as a form of green industrial policy, in-
dustrial transformation of existing industries will also form a key 
component of green industrial policy especially in relation to discussions 
of ‘deep decarbonisation’ of sectors such as steel [143]. 
Despite its elusiveness, the industrial policy lens is also a fruitful one 
through which to view sustainability transitions. It directs attention 
towards areas and issues including manufacturing, skills programmes 
and training, job retention and creation and under-researched key actors 
in transitions such as trade unions. Simultaneously, calls for enhanced 
green industrial policy to accelerate energy transitions through indus-
trial policy can benefit greatly from work done in sustainability transi-
tions on the balancing act between policies aimed at the niche and 
regime, the role of institutional rules, and key actors and networks in 
shaping the ‘balance’ between different types of industrial policy, and 
the political struggles inherent in constituting how that balance is 
weighted. Since our analysis rests on data collected in 2016/17 and 
energy transitions remain a highly dynamic field, future research should 
trace changes in perceptions of industrial policy in energy transitions in 
light of greater attention to Green New Deals and covid-19 recovery 
packages. 
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Table A2 
Industrial policy in the UK.   
Key point Illustrative quotation 
Role of industrial policy in 
energy transitions 
Lack of industrial policy in UK energyMarket-oriented 
approach and economic liberalisation as barrier for 
renewables 
“You had a kind of ad-hoc, the market will decide, which might be considered as 
industrial policy, I’m not sure. It’s not really a policy to just allow things to happen. I 
think as a result of that we do have a bit of a mismatch in terms of what energy we have.” 
(UK2, Politician)“So privatised industry hasn’t helped the cause for renewables either. 
Renewables are increasing but not as fast as they could have increased with a much more 
concerted effort. If we’d adopted the same enthusiasm and discipline and sense of 
direction and need to renewables as we did to post-war nuclear we wouldn’t be in a 
situation where we are today” (UK4, Ministry) 
Industrial visions A lack of vision around energy policy related to dominance 
of market-based approach 
“There’s not been a strategic plan for what the infrastructure can look like, what the 
infrastructure should look like and it’s been a little bit ad-hoc, i.e. I don’t know what the 
government thinks that the energy system is going to look like in ten years’ time, I’m not 
entirely convinced they know what it’s going to look like in ten years’ time, and whilst I 
don’t think we can expect them to be absolutely spot on in their predictions I think a 
direction of travel would be helpful.” (UK2, Politician) 
Industrial policy 
instruments 
R&D and innovation policy “They’ve started funding things that are potentially disruptive. They’ve started doing 
Smart Grid demonstration and started doing the whole portfolio of renewable 
technologies whether directly by government or agencies…now they have this Energy 
Systems Catapult which is the latest one” (UK1, Research) 
Industrial policy 
governance 
Scrapping of regional approach to industrial policy “That [regional approach] was scrapped. So, there were institutional frameworks being 
created under Labour, which were about, really, creating a low-carbon industrial 
strategy to deliver. The Miliband structure gave pre-eminence to different regions, 
would lead on different things. So, the West Midlands was to lead on electric vehicles, 
Yorkshire and the Humber with carbon capture, the South West was going to be nuclear, 
the North East was going to be offshore wind.” (UK7, Trade Union) 
Employment concerns Lack of involvement of trade unions in energy policyLoss of 
key engineering skills 
“I think the European model doesn’t apply in Britain, does it? I mean, the social 
partnership which is so prevalent in Germany and in Finland, where the natural thing for 
governments to do is to be seen to be in discussion with unions and with industry around 
the same table. I don’t want to over-romanticise this, but that is the norm. That is the 
Partnership Framework. It’s not normal in Britain.” (UK7, Trade Union)“…It’s not that 
CEGB were advocating and working to support renewables, they at least had engineers 
who understood the issues. Whereas today I should think that the numbers of, if you like, 
scientifically and engineering trained people still doing science and engineering in the 
privatised industry is very limited indeed.” (UK4, Ministry)  
Table A1 
Role of industrial policy and its elements in Germany.  
Elements Key points Illustrative quotations (own translation) 
Role of industrial policy 
in energy transition  
* The Energiewende as encapsulating green industrial policy   
* The Energiewende not being constituted by industrial policy 
“a very central [role] in deliberately building up industry” (DE11, Research)“The 
EEG has industrial policy effects but is not really an industrial policy instrument, 
but an energy-economic instrument” (DE15, Trade Union) 
Industrial visions  * Long term vision and consensus around energy system change 
encapsulated in the Energiewende   
* Perceived lack of strategic vision, but rather ‘muddling 
through’ in terms of evolving industrial policy 
“there has been a broad coalition…a strong consensus [..] about the nuclear phase- 
out, where you could say [..], that this is something collectively wanted. This is, I 
think, an important engine [..].” (DE15, Trade Union)“[..] there is rather some sort 
of muddling through and pragmatic solving of short-term problems rather than 
expose themselves and develop a rather long-term vision” (DE3, Think Tank). 
Industrial policy 
instruments  
* Protective measures for energy-intensive industries (including 
EEG surcharge exemptions foreseen in the Renewable Energy 
Sources Act)   
* Innovation policy to promote domestic technology 
development (including public R&D support in solar industry)   
* Export promotion extended to renewables 
“this first element [of industrial policy], the reactive, can be seen for example in 
the exemptions energy-intensive industries have from the EEG levy, from 
electricity taxes, so that in the end they have comparable energy costs to other 
OECD countries, or developed countries, or their foreign competitors – this is, I 
believe, something that was intended right from the outset.” (DE5, Think 
Tank)“Public R&D funding is extremely important in order to make sure that 
technology development is really taking place in the country where you want to 
have it…it is absolutely a key element. And there is a PV story between 2002 and 
2012 - it was a big success story which showed that it really worked: you had 
research results, you had educated people who came out of universities and who 
were needed building up the industry. It worked out very, very well.” (DE7, 
Research)“The ‘Export Initiative Strategy’ somehow merged with the ‘Mittelstand 
Global’…they are very bustling, do a lot of information tours, consult a lot of 




* Key role of regional industrial policies (e.g. stimulating offshore 
wind industry to mitigate job loss from ship-building)   
* Important role of regions in R&D programmes and experiments   
* (e.g. SINTEG programme) 
“Projects motivated by industrial and structural policy [..] create synergy effects 
for these regions and thus organise the transition of job losses from ship 
construction towards new occupations [in offshore wind]” (DE15, Trade 
Union)“We have the SINTEG programme with its various sub-programmes for 
promoting a decentralised grid structure. In Baden-Württemberg itself we have a 
few programmes [..] concerned with energy storage units and such things. There 
are a range of initiatives.” (DE4, Utility) 
Employment concerns  * Unions blocking low-carbon energy transition   
* Unions playing a progressive role in low-carbon energy 
transitions 
“Right now, both the Unions and politicians are blocking everything related to [..] 
lignite…we will fail magnificently to meet our 2020 climate targets” (DE2, 
Ministry)“The IG Metall Union is a very progressive union which has realised 
opportunities coming from the disruptive transformation of the energy system” 
(DE7, Research)  
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Industrial policy in Denmark.   
Key point Illustrative quotation 
Role of industrial policy 
in energy transitions 
Long term role of ‘top down’ push for wind in Denmark “wind turbines were developed by local manufacturers and created a lot of 
jobs so there was quite a drive towards wind power in the local communities. 
There was also a top down push from the department and there has been a 




Early tax relief schemes for wind turbine manufacturersSubsidies for 
offshore wind development to create an industryLong-term R&D and 
provision of test stations 
“I think the manufacturing sector has not been supported directly. They have 
been supported through the grants and subsidies to a point and they became 
the developers of the projects. Of course then that has enabled them to buy 
windmills and indirectly so we supported the manufacturers also” (DK 17, 
Industry Association).“The first offshore wind parks were again, heavily 
subsidised but I think that was more a subsidy to, you could say, the industry 
of wind turbine manufacturing. We have seen there was a potential that we 
could have a new export industry in Denmark.” (DK 7 Industry 
Association)“Some new technologies have also been assisted through R&D… 
we have built some test stations…these test stations are quite important for 
manufacturers because if they have a new concept in the pipeline they can go 
there and test it and correct it also” (DK 17, Industry Association) 
Industrial visions Long-standing vision of energy transitionPolitical vision and action “There’s been this common strong story about green transition and transition 
to a low CO2 a society and that’s a common task, a common goal that we 
have.” (DK 3, Ministry)“And they were forced to do it…[move towards 
offshore wind in the 1990 s]…and they didn’t like to do it, and at that time 
we were the first country- it was not the companies who wanted to do it. It 
was an obligation from governments who forced them to do it, and then they 
had to figure out how to handle it of course. And so this was a start of it, that 
it was a government pressure that started this” (DK 1, Utility) 
Industrial policy 
governance 
Change in the power of regions “The thing that has changed…Then it was 11 or something and now we are 5 
regions. The change is very specific that the regions have one major area, and 
that’s the hospitals. Then we have a minor area” (DK 8, Ministry) 
Employment concerns Trade Unions playing a supportive role in transitions due to emphasis on 
job creation 
“We convinced a lot of people in the unions back in the 90 s that green was 
not…disrupting the jobs, because you can create jobs….I think we had this 
discussion since at least the 80 s. It’s also circular economy and all these 
things. It’s a job creator.” (DK 19, Politician).  
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[37] C. Dhéret, M. Morosi, A. Frontini, A. Hedberg, R. Pardo, Towards a New Industrial 
Policy for Europe, Brussels, 2014. https://dx.doi.org/ISSN1782-494X. 
[38] E. Stolingen, Industrial Policy, Technology, and International Bargaining: 
Designing Nuclear Industries in Argentina and Brazil, Stanford University Press, 
Stanford, 1996. 
[39] P. Bianchi, S. Labory, From “old” industrial policies to “new” industrial 
development policies, in: Int. Handb. Ind. Policy, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 
2006, pp. 3–27. 
[40] B. Greenwald, J.E. Stiglitz, Industrial policies, the creation of a learning society, 
and economic development, in: J.E. Stiglitz, J. Yifu Lin (Eds.), Ind. Policy Revolut. 
I Role Gov. Beyond Ideol., Palgrave Macmillan, London, 2013, pp. 43–71. 
[41] J. Yifu Lin, C. Monga, Comparative advantage: the silver bullet of industrial 
policy, in: Ind. Policy Revolut., International Economic Association Series, 2013: 
pp. 19–38. 
[42] X. Vanden Bosch, Industrial policy in the EU: A guide to an elusive Concept, 
Brussels, 2014. www.academiapress.be. 
[43] J. Ossenbrink, S. Finnsson, C.R. Bening, V.H. Hoffmann, Delineating policy mixes: 
Contrasting top-down and bottom-up approaches to the case of energy-storage 
policy in California, Research Policy 48 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j. 
respol.2018.04.014. 
[45] M. Mazzucato, The Green Entrepreneurial State, Brighton, 2015. 
[46] M. Mazzucato, M. Cimoli, G. Dosi, J.E. Stiglitz, M.A. Landesmann, M. Pianta, 
R. Walz, T. Page, Which industrial policy does Europe need? Intereconomics 50 
(2015) 120–155, https://doi.org/10.1007/s10272-015-0535-1. 
[47] Franco Malerba, Sectoral systems of innovation and production, Research Policy 
31 (2) (2002) 247–264, https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(01)00139-1. 
[48] European Parliament, General principles of EU industrial policy, Eur. Parliam. 
Factsheet Webpages, 2016. http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/di 
splayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.9.1.html (accessed October 12, 2016). 
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[112] R. Lema, J. Nordensvärd, F. Urban, W. Lütkenhorst, Innovation Path in Wind 
Power - Insights from Denmark and Germany, Deutsches Institut für 




[113] J. Campbell, O. Pedersen, Comparative political studies Denmark in the global 
economy, Comparative Political Studies 40 (2007) 307–332, https://doi.org/ 
10.1177/0010414006286542. 
[114] TUC, Powering ahead: How UK industry can match Europe’s environmental 
leaders, London, 2016. 
[115] C.L. Ibsen, Trade Unions in Denmark, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Berlin, 2012. 
[116] C. Chlebna, The Role of Institutions for the Path dependent Development of the 
Wind Energy Industry in Germany and Britain, Oxford Brookes University, 2017. 
https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.nutr.23.011702.073307. 
[117] S. Vitols, German industrial policy: An overview, Industry and Innovation 4 
(1997) 15–36, https://doi.org/10.1080/13662719700000002. 
[118] P.A. Hall, D. Siskice (Eds.), Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations 
of Comparative Advantage, Oxford Univ Press, Oxford, 2001. 
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